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By joining the EMS on 16 June 1989, the peseta became the first currency to join the European 
exchange rate mechanism created ten years ago. On this tenth anniversary, the EMS, renowned 
for promoting non-inflationary growth and accelerating economic convergence, was hailed as a 
great success. However, in the wake of recent currency turbulence, punctuated in particular by 
three devaluations of the Spanish currency since September 1992, the European exchange rate 
system is suddenly accused of a variety of evils: slowing growth, anchoring on Germany, 
hindering Competitiveness - price of several states, etc. Some comments on the functioning of 
the ECM are as devastating today as they were laudatory at the end of the last decade.  
This radical change of opinion is an opportunity to take an interest in the particular situation of 
Spain at a crossroads of European monetary integration. After recalling the situation of the 
Spanish economy on the eve of its accession to the EMS, we will attempt to draw up an initial 
assessment of the entry of the peseta into the European exchange rate mechanism. 
Finally, the prospects offered by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for this country of 
Southern Europe, which is currently experiencing its deepest recession for thirty years, will be 
considered. 
I - The economic situation of Spain on the eve of its entry into the EMS 
Before studying the strengths and weaknesses of the Spanish economy on the eve of its entry into 
the EMS, we will examine the main lines of the policy implemented by the government from the 
year 1983. 
1.1- The main lines of economic policy 
The arrival of a socialist government in December 1982, will mark a break with a long tradition 
of interventionist government characterized by subsidies to unprofitable enterprises and desire 
put in place a relatively protected and closed economy. The objective of the new government 
will be to create the conditions for rapid and sustainable growth, promoting wage moderation 
and introducing reforms to strengthen the role of market mechanisms. 
During this period, the main axes of economic policy are as follows: 
- The opening of borders. Liberalization of foreign trade has been rapid since accession to the 
EEC and has led to the dismantling of trade barriers. Between 1986 and 1989, the gap between 
Spanish tariffs and the common external tariff fell by almost 40%; a further reduction is made 
each year until this gap disappears on 1 January 1993. The introduction of VAT 1 in 1986 led to 
the elimination of several border levies which corresponded to an indirect subsidy to the export 
or an implicit tax on importation. In addition, non-tariff barriers were significantly reduced in 
early 1986. 
- Liberalization of the economy. This took place in several directions. With entry into the Community, 
export subsidies were either banned or reduced. Greater flexibility of work was achieved with the 
introduction in 1984 of fixed-term employment contracts. In the banking and financial sector, several 
liberalization measures have been taken: deregulation of interest rates, partial liberalization of regulations 
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requiring banks to distribute part of the loans to certain sectors of the industry. In addition, exchange 
control has eased gradually (see Kirrane [1993]). 
- The reindustrialisation policy. The strategy of the new industrial policy, implemented since 
1983, is based on two principles. The first is to improve business productivity by reducing 
overstaffing, reducing productive overcapacity and increasing the profitability of the main ones. 
The next step is to help firms that specialize in growth sectors, invest and modernize. This policy 
of restructuring and financial reorganization also concerns the public sector since the State 
privatized a certain number of companies after having contributed to the improvement of their 
profitability (Cussaguet, 1988). 
1 VAT replaced the old turnover tax. 
SPAIN AND EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 
- Promoting entrepreneurship and enterprise. In addition to modernizing infrastructure, the 
government has encouraged companies to create joint ventures and to make more use of modern 
technologies. Research and development expenditure, which accounted for only 0.5% of GDP in 
1984, was to reach 1.3% in 1992. To achieve this objective, a "National Plan for Scientific 
Research and Technological Development" was adopted. (Scandella, deordolot, 1988). 
- The fight against unemployment. To reduce underemployment, the focus has been on 
increasing productive investment, and geographical and occupational mobility. The limited 
mobility of the labor force is explained, among other things, by the existence of a labor 
regulation adopted under the Franco regime, the "ordenanzas laborales", which still applies to 
about one quarter of SMEs. This regulation, based on a strict compartmentalization by 
profession, restricts the chances of horizontal and vertical mobility within each firm since the 
tasks of the workers are defined very precisely. 
- The reduction of inequalities. Social spending needs to keep pace with economic growth and 
reach out to the most disadvantaged social classes first. 
The pursuit of these objectives can only be achieved within the framework of a structural 
adjustment policy aimed at reducing inflation and the budget deficit, if necessary by using 
monetarist-inspired tools. In the face of inflationary pressures, however, the Spanish authorities 
will tighten the direction of macroeconomic policy and implement a restrictive monetary policy 
in 1988. The Bank of Spain's seven-day intervention rate rose steadily between August 1988 and 
April 1989, reaching 13.25%. The coefficient of reserves, which the banks must obligatorily 
constitute on the amount of the deposits which they collect, while being raised by 1,5%. 
Given the persistence of excessively strong demand growth relative to productive capacity, 
monetary policy tightened again in mid-1989. In addition to the increase in the rate of 
intervention and the coefficient of reserve requirements, the Minister of Economy, Carlos 
Solchaga, instituted a quantitative control of credit, like the one that existed in France until 1986. 
The increase in domestic credit distributed to the private sector by credit institutions was limited 
to 17% for 1989. 
1.2 - The beneficial effects of accession to the EEC 
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As mentioned by Kirrane (1994), by joining the EEC in 1986, Spain saw open a nearly unrestricted 
fifteen times greater than his market in terms of purchasing power. For the other members, the economic 
advantage of this accession was the obligation on Spain to dismantle its customs barriers. 2. 
Real possibilities appeared to develop the Spanish market for consumer goods and equipment. In 
fact, the Spanish population is one-eighth of that of the Community and has a lower standard of 
living than the population of the EEC. 
In many areas, the evolution of the Spanish economy until mid-1989 proved to be even more 
favorable than envisaged by the most loyal advocates of accession. Without denying the role of 
adjustment policy and the structural reforms described above, we can seek to isolate the role of 
accession to the EEC in the economic performance of Spain during this period. Entry into the 
Community has given a real boost to economic growth. The growth rate of GDP was even the 
highest among the OECD member countries in the second half of the 1980s. In addition to the 
increase in consumption, it is mainly the investment effort and the acceleration of GDP growth. 
The diffusion of technical progress that played a key role in this growth process. 
The opening of the Spanish market Global competition and the positive impact of high 
investment rates on firm competitiveness have significantly reduced inflationary pressures. The 
year 1988 was very satisfactory in this respect, since consumer prices failed to break the 5% 
barrier. 
Since accession, Spain has benefited from assistance under the Community's structural programs. 
The aim of these programs is to reduce disparities within the UNECE, and in particular to 
promote the development of backward regions. Between 1986 and 1988, Spain benefited from 
ECU 3.5 billion from the largest structural funds.3 These transfers from the Community to Spain 
were mainly earmarked for public infrastructure projects and training programs. 
Along with these transfers, Spain has attracted a large influx of foreign private capital were 
multiplied by 2.8 between 1986 and 1989 (Table 2). While portfolio investment is mainly due to 
the high level of Spanish interest rates and the rise of the Madrid Stock Exchange, the strong 
surge in direct investment is largely due to entry into the European Community. In the 
framework of the reindustrialisation policy, foreign groups have made it possible to overcome 
the shortcomings of the national productive apparatus by contributing know-how, increasing 
productivity through the use of high-performance machines and insertion into international 
distribution network4. In addition, certain multinational groups wanted to strengthen their 
presence in the booming Spanish domestic market and/or to create a profitable base - in terms of 
production costs - for the 1993 Single Market. 
1.3 - Macroeconomic imbalances Persistent 
If, in some ways, Spain has benefited from its membership in the Common Market, it has not 
solved problems such as insufficient savings and high levels of underemployment. In the field of 
foreign trade, European integration has also contributed to the deterioration of the current 
account balance. The analysis of the Spanish trade balance shows an increased deficit since entry 
into the EEC. This deficit has increased four-fold between 1986 and 1989. It thus appears that a 
phenomenon already observed in 1981 with the entry of Greece has been renewed: the opening 
up of an economy hitherto relatively protected and closed to stronger international competition 
leads in the first instance to a deterioration of the trade balance. 
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In the case of Spain, the gradual abolition of customs barriers and the strong growth in aggregate 
demand have led to a sharp rise in imports. From a quantitative point of view, the most important 
factor is the investment effort which has resulted in a rapid increase in imports of capital goods, 
whose share of total imports has increased from 19.9 in 1983 to 33.1% in 1989. The high level of 
these imports is mainly due to the modernization of the Spanish economy, revealing the need for 
catching up of several branches of industry which until then concentrated their activity - in the 
shelter protectionist measures - for the internal market. 
Another explanation is the expansion of private consumption. The increase in domestic 
consumption seems to have been benefited more European trading partners since the share of 
imports of goods from Current consumption has risen from 8.9% in 1985 to 13% in 1989. 
Another factor has swelled imports: the removal of quantitative restrictions on imported 
products. The appreciation of the real exchange rate of the peseta since 1985 has also contributed 
to the growth of the import penetration rate. 
In addition to the swelling of imports, the deterioration of foreign trade is due to the weak 
dynamism of exports. Since accession, Spanish exporters have in fact increased their market 
shares abroad in value, but have suffered a slight loss in volume. 
Several reasons explain the weak response of Spanish companies to the opening of the European 
market. With accession, export subsidies have been reduced or banned in some cases. The rapid 
expansion of domestic demand has prompted Spanish producers to favor their own market. The 
relative high level of inflation has led to a loss of international competitiveness. Finally, Spanish 
products tend to be more competitive than complementary to those of most European countries. 
Spain's specialization in the automotive and chemical industries and the emergence of an 
electronic industry can only reinforce this observation. Spanish industry also appears to be in 
competition with other southern countries, where it has a number of specialties (textiles, shoes, 
leather, skins). But Spain has higher gross labor costs than countries such as Greece or Portugal, 
and does not have the degree of innovation from Italy. 
The worsening of the trade deficit has weighed more heavily on the deterioration of the current 
account balance, since the invisible trade balance has remained largely in surplus, despite the 
decline in tourism receipts in 1989. The importance of net capital inflows to long run, however, 
resulted in a net positive balance in the basic balance. However, the steady reduction in the basic 
balance surplus from 1988 shows that the government's room for maneuver to finance the current 
account deficit narrowed. 
In addition to the problem of the current account deficit, the Spanish authorities are confronted 
with imbalances in the labor market and, first and foremost, with the high level of 
unemployment, which affected more than a fifth of the active population in 1986. Thanks to 
strong growth and recovery However, the unemployment rate declined slightly between 1985 
and 1989 underemployment in Spain remains high compared all EEC countries. 
For Bentolila and Blanchard (1990), the causes of this high unemployment are due to the 
following structural handicaps: 
- inadequate supply and demand of work in terms of qualification; 
- specialization in industries with a high proportion of labor, leading to a production deficit for 
most capital goods; 
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- rationalization movement in weakly competitive industries leading to massive layoffs; 
- low intervention of the unemployed in the formation of wages (phenomena of "insiders"). 
The last point concerns the financing capacity of households. This declined by almost 4% 
between 1985 and 1988 to 1.4% Except for British households with a 1988 financing gap, the 
financing capacity of Spanish households is the lowest in comparison with other OECD 
countries. 
This phenomenon is explained by the combination of a decrease in savings and an increase in 
While the rise in residential investment is due in part to tax benefits, the low savings rate is 
mainly due to higher consumption, higher income expectations5 and higher investment in 
housing. The aging of the salaried working-age population has been rejuvenated, as the low and 
declining savings rate of Spanish households has led to an increase in their indebtedness. This 
expectation can be explained by the high level of economic growth and positive effects of wealth 
that resulted.  
Beyond the political and economic reasons, the decision to participate in the European exchange 
rate mechanism has not failed to influence the functioning of the Spanish economy. 
2.1 - Motivations for joining the EMS 
As we have previously emphasized, the situation of the Spanish economy at the beginning of 
1989 is relatively satisfactory in several areas. Despite the weight of unemployment, the 
weakness of household savings, the high level of real interest rates and the current account 
deficit, the Spanish authorities have several sources of satisfaction such as the high growth rate, 
the slowdown in inflation, the surplus of the basic balance and the steady increase in foreign 
exchange reserves. 
The Spanish authorities will then take advantage of this favorable situation to join the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism on June 16, 1989 with a fluctuation margin extended to plus or 
minus6%, such as the Italian lira 6. This date of entry caused, the time, a surprise effect since 
Carlos Solchaga, Minister of Economy and Finance, announced on June 6 before the bankers and 
governors of central banks gathered for the International Monetary Conference (IMC) that Spain 
wanted to join at the EMS before July 1990. 
Beyond the purely economic motives, the decision to accede earlier to the EMS was also politically 
motivated (Kirrane 1996). Spain thus radically completed its first European presidency, reaffirming in 
passing its attachment to the Community. Similarly, the success of the government of Felipe Gonzales in 
the European elections showed that the Spaniards had not sanctioned its policy of rigor, yet hardly 
favorable to their purchasing power. As the Spanish government had sufficient credibility and popular 
support, it could make the decision to join the EMS, which, on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, 
confirmed its dynamism and evolution. 
From the economic point of view, the adherence of the peseta had several objectives: to mitigate 
the impact of real shocks, put an end to speculation on the Spanish currency and fight against 
inflation by reinforcing the credibility of economic policy. Work carried out by Ungerer, Evans, 
Nyberg (1986) on the first participants in the EMS show that the objectives of limiting the effects 
of real shocks and slowing down inflation are generally achieved. 
The gradual liberalization of capital movements, transfers received under the Community's 
structural programs and the attraction of high real interest rates have led to a massive influx of 
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capital, mainly in the form of direct investment and investment. portfolio These private foreign 
investments will contribute to the appreciation of the peseta, whose exchange rate against the 
DM has depreciated for years. 
The situation reverses in the first quarter of 1987. Since then and until the beginning of 1989, 
there has been a steady increase in the peseta against DM (Chart 1). From the autumn of 1988, 
the Spanish monetary authorities have to face a strong speculation on their currency. Foreign 
operators, anticipating a steady rise in the peseta, make important acquisitions, leading to a 
strong appreciation of the Spanish currency. 
In this context of destabilizing anticipation, the announcement of the accession of the Spanish 
currency to the European exchange rate mechanism aimed, by its unexpectedness, on the one 
hand to stop speculation and on the other hand to strengthen the credibility of the authorities as 
regards their monetary policy commitment. As in the case of Italy with the abandonment in 
January 1990 of the fluctuation band of the enlarged reading of 6%, the resident agents were as 
much the target of the message as the community partners. To bring the peseta into the EMS was 
to commit to stabilizing its price and thus to reducing the inflation differential with the other 
countries participating in the system; this reduction goes through a fight against the internal 
sources of price increases. 
2.2 - The paradox of the peseta 
The evolution of the peseta following its entry into the SME has been paradoxical. While 
inflation remained higher in Spain than in the Community and the trade deficit worsened, the 
Spanish currency tended to appreciate against other European currencies. 
This appreciation of the peseta despite deep internal imbalances can be explained by the asymmetrical 
functioning of the EMS (see Kirrane [1995]). The asymmetry stems from the fact that Germany, a 
country with weak inflation and having a perfectly substitutable currency against the dollar and the yen, 
determines the exchange rate of the area by the choice of its monetary policy. Under these conditions, the 
other EMS countries are obliged to control the parity of their currency vis-à-vis the Czech mark through 
their own monetary policy if they know of disturbances, these countries must stabilize their exchange 
rates without the German authorities to intervene. The asymmetry of the system entails as Artus (1990) 
points out, the performance of the French and German economies has become closer. Asymmetry also has 
the advantage of enhancing the credibility of the anti-inflationary policies put in place by governments 
other than Germany. The latter country with structurally weak inflation, the announcement of the research 
of a stable parity with the mark implies indeed that the private economic agents anticipate rigorous 
policies on the part of the central banks (Giavazzi-Pagano (1988)).  
In contrast, this asymmetric system is a source of instability. A weak dollar on the foreign 
exchange market leads to a transfer of floating capital to the mark, an appreciation of the latter 
and tensions between European currencies Moreover, the fact that countries other than Germany 
must control the parity of their own currency with respect to the mark means a loss of autonomy. 
Over the last decade, the convergence of economies and the credibility of anti-inflationary 
policies seem to have outweighed the risks of instability. The evolution of southern European 
countries in the early 1990s, however, has changed the nature of EMS representation. To use the 
terminology of Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990), the beginning of this decade was characterized by 
the appearance of a "new SME". 
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In this "new EMS", the least rigorous countries at the macroeconomic level were also the hard 
currency countries. This paradox stems from the fact that new members immediately benefit 
from the credibility of the system, which eliminates expectations of currency depreciation. 
However, if for internal reasons (financing of the public debt, control of domestic demand, etc.), 
they lead at the same time a policy of high interest rates, resulting in capital inflows that lead to 
appreciation of their currency (Vinals (1990) for Spain).As Artus and Dupuy (1990) 
demonstrate, there was a "new SME" phenomenon in Spain and Italy: high domestic interest 
rates and appreciation of the exchange rate despite deep internal imbalances. In the case of 
Spain, interest rates have been kept high to counteract inflationary pressures. The rapid rise in 
unit labor costs, the buoyancy of domestic demand and the rise in prices in the services sector 7 
explain in the main the inflation propensity of the Spanish economy. The high level of Spanish 
rates played a key role in the appreciation of the peseta; in 1991, the Spanish currency was 
considered the strongest currency of the European exchange rate mechanism. 
2.3 - A technical success 
From a point of view, the accession of the Iberian currency has undoubtedly been a success. 
Firstly because the suddenness of the decision has slowed speculative tensions. Then, from the 
first quotations, the Spanish currency has appreciated beyond its central rate, forcing the Bank of 
Spain to daily interventions on the foreign exchange market. 
Beyond this technical success, the entry of the peseta initially provoked greater monetary 
stability. The variability of the exchange rate of the peseta against the mark thus greatly 
diminished between the date of entry into the EMS and the summer of 1992 (Minda, 1993) - 
during this period the exchange rate of the peseta per For example, the mark has always been 
pegged between its central rate (65 pesetas) and its floor rate (61.2 pesetas). It should be noted 
that this less fluctuation in the exchange rate was accompanied by a parallel decrease in the 
variability of interest rates. 
While this monetary stability can also be explained by the tightening of monetary policy in mid-
1989, the decision to join the EMS exchange rate mechanism played a decisive role since 
speculative movements due to the anticipation of a rise have faded. The convergence of interest 
rates with other EMS countries has at the same time accelerated. 
Although Spanish short-term rates have remained high for several years, the differential with 
countries such as Germany and France narrowed until the summer of 1992 (Chart 2). The 
difference in nominal interest rates thus fell from 8% to 2.7% in three years (June 1989 - June 
1992) between Spain and Germany and from 5.7% to 2.4% in in respect of France. 
The anchor on German monetary policy is probably not as strong in Spain as in France, but it 
nevertheless served to further discipline Spanish monetary policy. 
2.4 - The emergence of new constraints in the decision to participate fully in European monetary 
integration has, however, posed several problems: 
- the appreciation of the peseta, combined with a rapid rise in wages and uncontrolled inflation, 
has contributed to degrade the balance of the trade balance; 
- the high level of interest rates has slowed down investment demand 
- Seigniorage receipts as a source of finance for the fiscal deficit have been abandoned; 
- The influx of foreign capital has fueled domestic demand, thus slowing down the 
disinflationary process. 
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Could the paradox of the peseta persist with the emergence of these new constraints? In the light 
of the evolution of the peseta in 1992, it appears that the phenomenon of the "new EMS" could 
only be transitory.This tendency to appreciation of the exchange rate in an economy 
characterized by imbalances is possible, but only if some. The income from the investment is 
measured by the cash flow: at M / Y, with M the monetary base and Y the real GDP Gros (1989) 
shows that under the effect of the EMS and the financial integration in Europe, Seigniorage 
incomes, which accounted for 2.34% of GDP during the period 1982-1987, were expected to be 
negative in 1992. 
These conditions are met only in the short term (Artus, Dupuy, 1990). These conditions for 
shifting to a monetary policy aiming at internal rather than external objectives are twofold: the 
imperfect mobility of capital and the use of currency reserves to stabilize the exchange rate. 
under the first condition, if the imperfect mobility of capital offers the advantage of not aligning 
domestic interest rates with international rates, it has the disadvantage of running up against the 
current globalization of capital markets. the use of foreign exchange reserves by the central bank, 
it cannot be practiced indefinitely. 
The appreciation of the peseta was also accompanied by a relatively unstable short-term 
equilibrium, since the current account deficit that occurred as early as 1988 was financed mainly 
by the entry of foreign capital. However, there are among these movements of portfolio capital 
particularly unstable. 
Under these conditions, there was a risk of a break in the equilibrium in the short term. For Artus 
(1991), the factors behind this break-up could be: 
- a fall in interest rates to boost investment and / or] 86 to reduce internal pressures in the EMS; 
- saturation of international portfolios, as investors no longer want to increase the peseta's share; 
- an exogenous movement of mistrust, leading to the appearance of anticipation of depreciation; 
- the willingness of public authorities to restore the balance of foreign trade; 
- a too rapid increase in labor costs, implying a slowdown in direct investment; 
- competition from Eastern European markets for the reception of investments and foreign 
capital. 
The attacks on the peseta during the second half of 1992 and the recent turbulence of the EMS 
show that these fears of a break-up were not unjustified. 
III - From SME to EMU: what perspectives for the Spanish economy? 
The Economic and Monetary Component of the Maastricht Treaty provides that EMU will be carried out 
in stages to enable member states to control the liberalization of capital movements. However, the 
Spanish bank abolished the exchange control measures on 1 February 1992. To gradually adapt their 
economic policies to the requirements of the changeover to a single currency (see Kirrane [1994]). The 
analysis of the potential benefits and costs of the transition phase in Spain will allow us to see how the 
peseta behaves in the period of monetary turbulence that has been shaking Europe since autumn 1992. 
31- peseta and the monetary crisis of autumn 1992 
The EMS, which entered into force on 13 March 1979, aimed at establishing more stable 
exchange rate relations between European currencies in the context of increased economic 
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convergence. From 1979 to 1987, the divergence in economic performance - particularly in 
inflation - will be accompanied by multiple realignments of parity. In fact, it will take until 
January 1987 to see the EMS operate as a relatively fixed exchange rate system. 
Since then, not only have the participating currencies overcame the crises (1987 stock market 
crash, dollar depreciation, economic recession) but other currencies have joined the European 
exchange rate mechanism: the Spanish peseta in June 1989, then the pound in October 1990 and 
finally the Portuguese escudo in April 1992. In January 1990, the Italian Government announced 
the reduction of the fluctuation band of the lira from 6 to 2.25% on both sides of the central rate. 
The European exchange rate mechanism, which is known to foster non-inflationary growth and 
accelerate the convergence of the economic performance of the majority of members, has 
gradually been considered a success. However, thanks to the monetary turmoil that has shaken 
Europe since the autumn of 1992, the SME is suddenly accused of the most various evils: 
slowing growth, anchoring on Germany, hindering the competitiveness of several states. Some 
comments on how the EMS works are as devastating today as they were laudatory at the end of 
the last decade. 
It is true that in mid-September 1992 the fixity of the currencies which prevailed since the last 
readjustment of January 1987 was abruptly put in question. European central banks have not 
been able to stem market forces which, on the occasion of the Danish 'no' vote and the French 
referendum, have begun to doubt the irreversibility of the march towards the single currency and 
the fixed exchange rate at within the Community. These doubts have led operators and 
speculators to re-examine the strengths and weaknesses of different countries. From a monetary 
point of view, this review led to two observations: first, the lira and the peseta were widely 
overvalued, on the other hand, keeping the book at his level required the continuation of an 
austerity policy which was hardly compatible with Britain's strongest recession since the 1930s. 
This situation will exacerbate the tensions on the foreign exchange markets and trigger a 
redevelopment within the EMS. This readjustment started in September 1992 with devaluations 
of the lira of 3.5% and the peseta of 5% continued in November with a further devaluation of 6% 
of the Spanish currency and the Portuguese escudo. The floating of the lira and the pound and the 
restoration or strengthening of exchange controls in some countries (Spain, Ireland, Portugal) 
will also mark this period of turbulence. 
This realignment of parities conceals, however, a deeper monetary crisis. The introduction of 
new currencies has accelerated first the cleavage within the Community. Around the mark, a 
hard core seems to have formed, bringing together currencies with relatively low fluctuations as 
the florin, the Danish krone and the Belgian franc or relatively moderate as the French franc. On 
the other hand, the last arrivals know a greater volatility of the prices of their currency (read, 
pound sterling, peseta, escudo). The lira and the peseta have always been considered as the 
currencies or the strongest or the weakest of the European exchange rate mechanism. 
The slowdown in economic activity, which has been very pronounced in Europe since autumn 
1991, has also delayed economic convergence and created new tensions. The lack of rapid 
convergence of inflation rates has led to a real appreciation of weak currencies such as the lira 
and the peseta, leading to a loss of competitiveness compared to the most virtuous countries. In 
countries where the primacy of the protected sector in the wage bargaining process and where 
the indexation principle has not been questioned, the use of the ERM as a tool to combat 
inflation proven to be perilous as it has led to slow convergence in price, while putting the cost 
of this policy on the sector exposed to foreign competition. 
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German reunification, which took place in July 1990, naturally amplified the crisis of the system 
since the high level of German rates is in contradiction with the needs of other European 
countries. The restrictive monetary policy pursued in Germany has, however, further hampered 
low-inflation countries and the asymmetry of the EMS has intensified as it began to be used as 
an instrument of convergence. 
The peseta could not withstand the turmoil that shook the European exchange markets. At the 
end of summer 1992, several observers estimated that the Spanish currency was overvalued by at 
least 15%. Such a level of the exchange rate proved to be less and less compatible with the 
difficulties faced by the Spanish economy. In fact, Spain's lack of competitiveness, linked to the 
overvaluation of its currency, has led to a further increase in the trade deficit, which reached Pta 
3 600 billion in 1992, compared to Pta 3 446 billion in 1991, or 6.2% of GDP. In addition, 
foreign capital inflows into Spain were on the brink of drying up. The improvement in the 
tourism surplus due to the World Expo and the Olympic Games did not slow the deterioration of 
the current account deficit, the first devaluation of 5% in September was inevitable. 
The actual depreciation of the peseta against the mark was even stronger because the Spanish 
currency, which was at the head of the EMS, was in last place, well below its central rates. This 
readjustment of the peseta, however, did not stop the mistrust of it. Since the release of the lira 
and the EMS pound, the differences in inflation as well as the greater or lesser control of fiscal 
deficits have caused a lack of credibility with respect to the less virtuous countries of the system. 
This is why the peseta suffered a second devaluation of 6% on 21 November 1992.  
3.2 - Expected benefits of EMU 
If the introduction of EMU will have repercussions for all Member States it is still too early to 
know precisely the geographical breakdown of the advantages and disadvantages that will result. 
In addition to the difficulty of predicting in the long term, the project to create a single currency 
leaves many gray areas unclear about its implementation. 
Subject to transitional adjustments, one can nevertheless try to consider the expected benefits of 
strengthening monetary integration. Excluding micro-economic impacts, the existence of a single 
currency could provide the following macro-economic benefits: 
- the removal of customs barriers and the opening of public markets are likely to exert size of 
markets and competitive effects; 
- the liberalization of capital movements and financial services is expected to decrease the cost of 
intermediation, resulting in a positive effect on investment; 
- the emergence of a capital market at European level will favor the convergence of interest rates 
and rates of return on financial assets as well as a better allocation of savings within the 
Community; 
- strengthening economic convergence will require an extension of monetary and fiscal discipline 
to the less virtuous countries. 
Will the favorable effects reverberate in the same way in all countries? It is permissible to doubt 
it. Indeed, the diversity of the economic and social structures within the Community, as well as 
the uneven stage of development in which the countries of the Community have arrived, make 
the idea of a distribution unlikely naturally equitable for European monetary integration. Aware 
of this diversity, the European Commission has also adopted convergence indicators relating to 
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the economic policy of states and not to the structure of their economies. Consideration of the 
structural variables would undoubtedly have prevented the accession of the least developed 
countries. 
For the latter, the first step towards integration, which consists in the free movement of capital, 
implies an alignment of interest rates. As the smaller development of these countries leads to a 
relatively large investment demand, interest rates are currently at a high level. Therefore, 
financial integration can only accentuate a fall in these same rates, which has beneficial effects 
on investment and growth. 
This expected drop in interest rates should favor Spain and Italy, which have a particularly high 
level of interest rates. Nominal short-term interest rates in Spain are thus much higher than those 
prevailing in the other major nations of the Community. After a slight easing started in mid-
1991, Spanish short-term rates again crossed the 15% mark in 1992. In comparison, Spanish 
interbank lending rates in March 1993 were 7.5% higher than in Germany (15.8% against 8.3%). 
In order to benefit from this foreseeable fall in rates, Spain will need however, to release a level 
of savings capable of adjusting to an increase in investment. If not, the call for foreign savings 
may widen the current account deficit and thus delay convergence. The inadequacy of domestic 
private savings can, however, be offset by an increase in public savings through adequate tax 
policy (Artus, 1991b). 
The structural weakness of savings could be partially mitigated by the continuation of 
redistributive actions at Community level. The Spanish government has therefore recommended 
aid from the most advanced countries to EMU to countries or regions that are lagging behind 
during the transition phase (Bruno, Le Cacheux, Mathieu, 1991). This assistance would in turn 
require the creation of a Compensation Fund whose objective would be to stimulate tangible and 
intangible investment in countries where GNP per capita does not exceed 90% of the average 
GDP per capita of the Community. 
In their wake, the Spaniards have even proposed that the contribution of the least developed 
countries to community projects be revised downwards, so that these countries can strengthen 
their convergence program. The Spanish proposals have received a favorable response from the 
European authorities since, under the Maastricht Treaty, the Twelve have planned a "Cohesion 
Fund" which will be responsible for a large part of the public expenditure of the least prosperous 
countries in two particular sectors. : transport infrastructure and the protection of the 
environment. At the Edinburgh Summit of December 1992, the Twelve decided that the 
Cohesion Fund will have about ECU 15 billion for the period 1993-1999, more than half of 
which is earmarked for Spain. 
This Cohesion Fund, however, represents only a small part of the ECU 176 billion planned by 
the Community to reduce regional and social disparities within the Europe of the Twelve over 
the period 1993-1999. In all, the regions and the poorest social categories will receive during 
these six years, almost double the aid paid from 1988 to 1992. 
The convergence indicators adopted as well as the prohibition to finance the deficits of the public 
finances by "the billboards "should also require the Spanish authorities to more discipline, 
particularly in terms of budget and salary. The sharp deterioration of public finances in 1992 
forced the Spanish government to vote a budget collective in order to limit certain expenses and 
to obtain additional revenues. The measures adopted include a reduction in social transfers, 
higher marginal tax rate from 0.5% to 3% depending on income levels, decreased tax deductions 
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and an increase in rates average of 13 to 15% VAT. This budgetary rigor must continue since the 
1993 budget has been described as the "most restrictive of the last twenty years" by Carlos 
Solchaga. 
The government has understood the need to be rigorous so that Spain can enter the final phase of 
EMU. This rigor will be all the more useful as the slowdown in activity in 1992 was not 
accompanied by a decline in price increases comparable to that recorded in the major 
industrialized countries. Inflation, which reached 5.9% in 1992, was mainly fueled by service 
prices (+ 10.2%) and wage growth (+ 8.5%); the raising of the VAT rate and the rise in energy 
costs being offset by the small increase in food prices. 
3.3 - The potential costs of the transition period In parallel with the creation of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI), the second stage of EMU, which will open on 1 January 1994, aims to 
ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic 
performance of the Member States. The introduction of a single currency and a European Central 
Bank imply irrevocably fixed conversion rates between the currencies of the member countries. 
However, fixed exchange rates require a strengthening of economic and monetary cohesion. 
In order to enter the final stage of EMU, which will start no later than 1 January 1999, the 
candidate countries will therefore have to jointly pursue an orthodox monetary policy and a 
rigorous fiscal policy. The "good European student", to use an expression of La Bruslerie (1992), 
will have to control its inflation, limit its indebtedness and reinforce the strength of its currency 
on the European exchange market. 
The Monetary Union will impose an economic convergence effort on the Twelve, particularly 
severe for the less virtuous. If the deadline seems still distant, a comparison with the current 
situation is however not without interest. Only two countries (France and Luxembourg) fulfilled 
the conditions of transition to the third stage of EMU in 1992. The situations in the other ten 
countries are very contrasting. Denmark, apart from the increase in its public debt, is very close 
to France and Luxembourg; the slight recovery in inflation and the budget deficit observed in 
Germany are probably only transitory. 
The Netherlands, Ireland and above all Belgium have difficulties in managing their public 
finances but also have relatively stable currencies and satisfactory inflation rates. On the basis of 
the criteria mentioned above, the single currency could therefore only be constituted today by a 
core group of four countries; the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium needing a derogation to clean 
up their public finances. 
With the exception of the United Kingdom, whose membership is more dependent on political 
will than on the satisfaction of economic indicators, the situation facing the countries of Southern 
Europe is more worrying. . It is hard to imagine Greece, Portugal and Italy succeeding in the next 
two years or even four years. 15 Especially the Dutch guilder and the Belgian franc (Cfla 
devaluation of the Irish pound by 10% on 31 January 1993). All convergence indicators. In this 
group of countries, Spain occupies a special place insofar as it is the only nation in Southern 
Europe to meet today a criterion of convergence. 
However, in order to be able to quickly get closer to the European average, Spain will have to 
impose a severe austerity cure. This cure has already begun since the measures initially planned 
to reduce the budget and external deficits have been made even more urgent by the first two 
devaluations of the peseta. The Finance Act for 1993 thus provides for an increase in non-
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financial receipts of 6.9% and an increase in expenditure of 3.7%, a decline in real terms. The 
temporary increase of the income tax for 1992 is maintained in 1993. In addition to the freezing 
of the purchasing power of civil servants, certain ministries such as those of Defense, Transport 
and Housing have had their budgets particularly affected. The finance law initially voted aims to 
reduce the budget deficit to 3.9% of GDP in 1993 against 4.6% in 1992. The scenario of the 
Ministry of Economy seems optimistic because it is based on an assumption of growth of GDP 
for 1993 of 1.1%. However, according to the latest forecasts of Spanish banks, the growth rate 
should be less than 0.5%, 194 against 1.1% in 1992. 
Here we measure the difficulty for the countries of Southern Europe to get closer to convergence 
criteria. The objective of the Monetary Union requires them to implement remediation plans at a 
time when Europe is experiencing a severe economic slowdown. The problem of EMU is that it 
forces the less prosperous countries to accentuate the slowdown in activity, whereas the 
economic situation should encourage them to oppose it (Clerc, 1992). 
Spain in particular is preparing to experience in 1993 the biggest recession in thirty years. 
Domestic demand, the main driver of growth in the late 1980s, decelerated sharply in 1992. 
Household consumption, which was still growing at an annual rate of 3% in 1991, is expected to 
increase modestly by 1% in 1993. Despite substantial increases in nominal wages, the trend in 
disposable income has been affected by the tightening of household taxation and rising 
unemployment. The weakness of private consumption is likely to have repercussions on 
investment, the decline of which could continue with the end of the major works of the Olympic 
Games in Barcelona and the Seville World Expo. The stimulus MINIPLAN adopted at the end of 
February cannot seem to avoid a decline in GDP in 1993- 
However, the slowdown in domestic demand has encouraged slight decrease in the trade deficit 
in the last quarter of 1992. The worsening of the current account deficit in 1992 reflects the 
deterioration of the trade balance but also a reduction of surpluses in services and transfers. The 
entry of the economy into recession should be accompanied by a fall in inflation as the impact of 
the double devaluation of the peseta could be offset by weak domestic demand. This sudden 
contraction of the economy is due to external as well as internal reasons. Spain, like other 
European countries, is suffering the negative effects of the slowdown in the global economy and 
recent uncertainties about monetary developments in Europe. Added to this is a restrictive 
monetary policy stance and a tightening of fiscal policies in most countries of the Community. 
Internally, the main factor is the decline in the flow of foreign direct investment. Foreign capital 
in industry and real estate accounted for about 3% of GDP in the late 1980s. This ratio fell to 2% 
in 1992 and is expected to continue to decline. This decline in foreign investors is a consequence 
of the maturity reached by the Spanish economy, which offers as much as in the past an 
attractive comparative advantage. 
3.4- The "cold" readjustment of the peseta in May 1993 
The deterioration of the economic situation has had repercussions on the foreign exchange 
market as evidenced by the fragility of the peseta at the end of February 1993 A further 
weakening was not to be ruled out because the Spanish currency, which was the most overvalued 
of the EMS, was less depreciated than reading it or the pound. The risks of depreciation persisted 
all the more since the double devaluation of 1992 brought as many damages as benefits to the 
Spanish economy. While foreign tourists and exporting companies are in principle the main 
beneficiaries of these devaluations, they generate imported inflation at the same time, while 
increasing the amount of foreign currency denominated loans. 
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The fragility of the peseta required the maintenance of interest rates at a high level. At the end of 
March, interbank lending rates were close to 16%, compared to 12% before the tensions caused 
by the first Danish referendum of June 1992. With real interest rates of around 10%, it was 
unrealistic to wait for a recovery in investment or to consider improving the profitability of 
companies. On the other hand, while the peseta's rise against the mark or the franc has been 
almost fully offset, some European countries have made 296 competitive devaluations, which 
have caused Spain to lose the benefits of devaluations in terms of competitiveness (BNP, 1993) 
due to insufficient control over wage increases and the rigidity of the Spanish social system. 
The attacks against the Spanish currency have however intensified since April 12 exactly, date of 
the announcement of early parliamentary elections. Political uncertainty over the outcome of the 
June 6 poll, speculation has cost almost $ 4 billion in April alone to the Bank of Spain, whose 
reserves at the end of April 44.4 billion dollars, compared to 72.2 billion in June 1992. As a 
result, the entry of the economy into recession, with GDP declining by 0.3% in the fourth quarter 
of 1992, made it untenable to maintain the highest interest rates. of the Community, which are 
essential to support the Spanish currency, but which are socially damaging, as evidenced by the 
surge in unemployment. Last year, the number of jobseekers increased by 668,000. In March 
1993, the Ministry of the Economy had 253,000 more, which brought to 3,300,000 victims of 
unemployment, a record rate of 21.7%. 17 Following the double devaluation of the peseta in 
1992, Spanish exports gained price-competitiveness, only in Belgium (Caisses des Deposits et 
Consignations, 1993). 
By accepting a devaluation of 8% of the peseta on May 13, the Spanish government wanted to 
stop speculation fueled by the rapid deterioration of the economy and the approach of legislative 
elections. This third devaluation in less than eight months was accompanied by a drop in the 
Bank of Spain's key interest rate from 13 to 11.5%, allowing Spain to start the process of 
lowering interest rates. Europe and also satisfy the Spanish employers who had long called for a 
reduction in the rent of money. 
The devaluation of the peseta, which led in its wake that of the Portuguese escudo of 6.5%, was 
made "cold" 18 in a concerted and without dramatization. This is the first time since the 
monetary turmoil of the autumn of 1992, and since the revaluation of the mark in January 1987, 
that a devaluation is thus decided, by surprise and in the middle of the week, at a meeting of 
support of the European Monetary Committee. This readjustment reminds us in passing that the 
EMS was originally designed as a system operating with "fixed but adjustable" parities. A "cold" 
management of future readjustments would no doubt allow the EMS to regain its credibility and 
avoid wild and competitive devaluations such as the Pound and the Lira, currencies that are 
clearly undervalued relative to purchasing power parity estimates. Two recent reports, one from 
the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of Customs and the other from the Monetary 
Committee, acknowledged that a return to the effective functioning of the EMS involved "cold" 
and "more" parity changes to take account of the competitiveness differentials accumulated by 
each Member State. 
The entry of the Spanish economy into a period of recession may make the cost of the transition 
phase to EMU more painful. The decline in inflation - which remains the Achille heel of the 
economy - and the reduction of fiscal deficits are not without consequences. They lead to 
pressures on the purchasing power of households and loss of business opportunities, which 
inevitably aggravates unemployment. 
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Apart from a recovery in the world economy and structural reforms such as those aimed at 
stimulating domestic competition in services (see the rise in prices in this sector), would not 
other means exist to mitigate the constraints? of the transition? Clerc proposes three ways that 
can better spread the cost of the transition : longer convergence times, greater financial solidarity 
within the Community and a more equitable distribution within each country. The first solution 
would have the disadvantage of delaying economic convergence and further strengthening the 
existence of of a multi-speed Europe, but it would offer the advantage of spreading the social 
cost of the monetary union over a longer period, and thus more bearable because less intense The 
Maastricht Treaty has provided for a derogation, ie a longer transition period to the third phase, 
for those countries that request it. 
The organization of financial solidarity around the Cohesion Fund is undoubtedly an excellent 
way to mitigate the disparities of development within the Europe of the Twelve. Will the funds 
released be sufficient to make the transition more sustainable, given that the Community budget 
currently accounts for around 1% of Community GDP? 
The third way, which is to better distribute the social impact of convergence programs, refers to 
choices of economic and social policy. Such a policy of support is undoubtedly desirable but its 
implementation is made difficult by the current economic situation. It is easier to fight 
inequalities in prosperity than in recession. 
While the downturn in economic activity in Europe may complicate the transition from the EMS 
to EMU, it is clear that a correction of the asymmetry of the costs and benefits over time of the 
monetary union will require similar initiatives. national rather than European. The task of Spain, 
which is moving towards a painful period of adjustment, would no doubt have been facilitated by 
a broader conception of economic convergence. In view of all these elements, it remains to be 
hoped that the application of the Maastricht Treaty will be more flexible than its elaboration. 
The march towards the European Union will require, in the process, a reform of the mode of 
operation of the EMS. A unified market in which goods and capital circulate freely needs relative 
monetary stability. The decision taken last summer to widen the margins of fluctuation to 15% 
around the central rates is more a means of curbing the ardor of speculators than a solution to the 
structural problems of the monetary Europe. Pending a redesign of the EMS, the temporary 
floating of European currencies has been accompanied by a decline in interest rates, including in 
Spain, which should ultimately promote a recovery in growth. 
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